There's no business rationale for achieving this the traditional way. Canada is roughly a tenth of the US population, so you'd never justify maintaining comparable inventory levels or the vendor support staff to match. I was one of the earliest adopters of a nascent program piloting a "North American" fulfillment model, which let us leverage existing US vendor relationships and supply chain infrastructure instead of building a parallel one from scratch. What started as a solution for the long tail of apparel selection ended up more than doubling the catalog — over a million new SKUs — with stronger vendor terms and 110% year-over-year revenue growth.

I was brought into Prime Video to figure out what was going on with pricing for their purchase and rental catalog — content was sometimes priced too low, sometimes inconsistently, and nobody had a clean explanation for why. My read was that there were both structural and strategic issues: Prime Video wasn't using the more sophisticated pricing science that existed elsewhere in Amazon's businesses, and the underlying system had accumulated over 160 technical rules and unintended input translations that nobody had fully mapped. Rather than pushing for a platform overhaul, I worked with engineering and finance to make targeted, low-lift fixes that delivered over 100 basis points of sustained margin improvement without touching conversion.

The technology was new, the store format had never been done at this scale, and the entire team was remote. None of that changed the timeline. I built the operating infrastructure for the launch: a playbook, a critical-path schedule, and a readiness tracker that pulled together over 250 deliverables across more than 100 partners spanning eight VP organizations. Seven more stores launched in the three months after the first, making it the fastest initial physical store expansion in Amazon's history.

The surface question was about planning, but the harder problem was alignment — getting Product, Engineering, Finance, Operations, and Real Estate to agree on shared priorities when each team had its own view of what mattered most. I redesigned the strategic planning process to make tradeoffs visible and dependencies explicit, so teams could see how their work connected to everyone else's. That groundwork led to executive approval for billions in investment across supply chain, hardware, real estate, and headcount, with a prioritization framework that teams could actually use together.

Two problems drew me to Amazon Business: first, Amazon itself wasn't using its own private label products in many cases where they were available — its own corporate offices and fulfillment centers weren't buying Amazon Basics. Second, there was a persistent narrative in business and sales leadership that the absence of specific services was causing high-value enterprise customers to look elsewhere. I joined as the first IC PM to scope the actual opportunity, working through customer research, capability mapping, and industry benchmarking across a roughly $75B market. That work led to a three-year roadmap representing about $500MM in opportunity and the MVP launch of the first service offering.